



The Bulgarian-Yugoslav Dispute over the Macedonian Question as a 
Reflection of the Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy (1968–1980)
Abstract: During the Cold War, relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were 
marred by the Macedonian Question. Bulgaria challenged the historical roots of the 
Macedonian nation, whereas Yugoslavia insisted that Bulgaria should recognise the 
rights of the Macedonian minority within her borders. The Soviet Union capitalised 
on its influence over Bulgaria to impair Yugoslavia’s international position. Bulgaria 
launched an anti-Yugoslav campaign questioning not only the Yugoslav approach to 
Socialism, but also the Yugoslav solution of the Macedonian Question. This antipathy 
became evident in 1968, in the wake of the events in Czechoslovakia. In the years 
1978/9 the developments in Indochina gave a new impetus to the old Bulgarian-
Yugoslav conflict.
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When Benedict Anderson decided to deal with matters of nationalism and to write his book Imagined Communities, he was astonished by 
the developments in Indochina in 1978/9, the conflict between Vietnam 
and Cambodia, Vietnam’s military intervention in Cambodia, the over-
throw of the Khmer Rouge regime, and China’s subsequent limited invasion 
of Vietnam. The main question he was facing consisted in determining how 
Communist countries could dispute the questions of nationalism, identity 
and national borders, and the “onerous legacy” of capitalism. However, An-
derson did not notice that another conflict of a similar nature was affecting 
the intra-Balkan relations at the same time. It was the Bulgarian-Yugoslav 
dispute over the Macedonian Question which had been reopened ten years 
earlier and reached its peak in 1978/9.1
1 For the Yugoslav solution of the Macedonian Question with intra-Balkan implications, 
see Stephen E. Palmer Jr. & Robert R. King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian 
Question (Hamden, CT: The Shoe String Press, Inc. Archon Books, 1971). The Bulgar-
ian army of occupation was hailed in the Serbian part of Macedonia in April 1941 as 
an army of liberation, and during the first stage of occupation pro-Bulgarian feeling 
ran high. There was no Communist Party of Macedonia, because the Yugoslav Com-
munist Party’s decision of 1934 to form one had been impossible to carry out. The local 
Communists, under Metodija Šatorov broke away from the Yugoslav Communist Party 
and joined the Bulgarian Workers’ Party. There was little support for Tito’s resistance 




From 1948 to 1962 the Bulgarian Communist Party tried to bal-
ance the ideological components of Macedonism with Bulgarian state in-
terests, but unsuccessfully.2 It did not deny the process of configuration of a 
new Slav identity in the People’s Republic of Macedonia within the frame-
work of Yugoslav Federation from 1944 onwards, but it called its historical 
roots into question. According to the Bulgarian thesis, the Slav population 
in Yugoslav Macedonia cut off the umbilical cord with the Bulgarians due 
to the political developments in the Balkans after the First and Second 
World Wars and tied its fate to the Yugoslav peoples. The new Macedonian 
nation should not have been built upon an anti-Bulgarian basis. The Slav 
population in the Bulgarian part of Macedonia was an integral part of the 
Bulgarian nation, since it had been included in the Bulgarian state after the 
Balkan Wars and did not share the experience of the Bulgarians in Yugoslav 
Macedonia. Thus, according to the Bulgarian thesis, Yugoslavia’s demand 
for the recognition of a Macedonian minority by the Bulgarian authorities 
was unfounded.
Tito’s envoy to Yugoslav Macedonia, Svetozar Vukmanović aka Tempo, in March 1943. 
But Bulgarian administration proved to be unsuccessful and caused discontent. After 
Italy capitulated (September 1943) and it became obvious that Germany and Bulgaria 
would be defeated, there was armed resistance. The Yugoslav Communist Party pushed 
for the Communist International’s earlier notion of a separate Macedonian nation and 
the formation of a united Macedonia (comprising the Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian 
parts) within a Yugoslav federation. The first session of the Anti-Fascist Council of 
the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) announced, on 2 August 1944, the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of Macedonia as a Macedonian Piedmont. After 
the creation of the state, a nation-building process was inaugurated for the configura-
tion of a Macedonian identity (applicable only to Slavs), mainly on an anti-Bulgarian 
basis. Yugoslavia’s expansionist intentions in the name of Macedonism were blatantly 
apparent in her plans for the creation of a South-Slav federation or in its embroilment 
in the Greek Civil War. After Tito’s rupture with the Cominform in June 1948, the 
Yugoslav leadership abandoned its plans for a conclusive solution of the Macedonian 
Question and concentrated on the cultivation and consolidation of the new national 
identity of the Slav population of Yugoslav Macedonia and on stamping out rival influ-
ences. At the same time, the Yugoslav leaders were raising the issue of respect for the 
rights of putative Macedonian minorities in the neighbouring countries.
2 For general information, see Spyridon Sfetas, To Μακεδονικό και η Βουλγαρία. Πλήρη 
τα απόρρητα βουλγαρικά έγγραφα 1950–1967 [The Macedonian Question and Bul-
garia. Classified Bulgarian documents 1950–1967] (Thessaloniki: Society for Macedo-
nian Studies - Bulgarian State Archives, 2009). Iva Burilkova & Tsocho Biliarski, eds., 
Makedonskiiat Vupros v bulgaro-iugoslavskite otnosheniia 1950–1967 g. Dokumentalen 
sbornik [The Macedonian Question in Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations 1950–1967. A col-
lection of documents] (Sofia: State Archives Agency. “Archives are speaking”, 2010). 
Djoko Tripković, “Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi 50-ih i 60-ih godina 20.veka”, Tokovi 
istorije 1-2 (2009), 84-106.
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Nevertheless, Bulgaria’s policy on the Macedonian Question was 
contingent on the developments in relations between Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet historical and linguistic science accepted Mac-
edonism as a new parameter in Balkan politics. The Communist Interna-
tional had propagated the notion of an explicit Macedonian nation in 1934; 
the theoretical argumentation for the existence of a Macedonian nation in 
the 1930s had been based on Stalin’s concept of nation,3 and on his thesis 
that ethnic groups could become Socialist nations by achieving statehood 
and developing their culture in a Socialist society. Of course, there is no 
historical evidence for the existence of the Macedonian nation. In fact, the 
political notion of Macedonism neutralise the old Serbian-Bulgarian an-
tagonism over the identity of the Slavs in Macedonia and offered a new 
alternative for the settlement of the Macedonian Question, patterned after 
the Soviet model for the Belarusian or the Moldavian nation.
Irrespective of historical or political dimensions of Macedonism, 
the Soviet Union instrumentalised the Macedonian Question in the Bul-
garian-Yugoslav dispute, according to its interests, playing one side against 
the other. After Stalin’s breach with Tito (1948), the Soviet Union tolerated 
Bulgaria’s campaign against the Yugoslav leader, who was branded by So-
fia as “traitor of the interests of the Macedonian people, enslaved to Tito’s 
clique and Western imperialists”. The Bulgarian Communist Party portrayed 
the Bulgarian part of Macedonia as the only liberated part of Macedonia, 
stressed the affinity and historical bonds between Bulgarians and Macedo-
nians and called upon the Macedonians in Yugoslav Macedonia to rise up 
against Tito. When the process of normalisation of Bulgarian-Yugoslav re-
lations began in 1955–56, Bulgaria was compelled to get accustomed to the 
new situation, and it watered down its campaign against Yugoslavia. Under 
Yugoslav pressure, it gave signs of its willingness to recognise a Macedonian 
minority, as it had in 1946–47. The census of 1956 showed that more than 
180,000 people in the Bulgarian part of Macedonia declared themselves 
as Macedonians. Even if Bulgaria did not see the Macedonians as a na-
tional minority, but rather as a cultural group closely linked to the Bulgar-
ian people, the simple fact that Macedonians were mentioned in Bulgarian 
statistics gave Yugoslavia the justification to demand that their rights be re-
spected. Had Bulgaria officially recognised a Macedonian minority within 
her borders, she would in fact have accepted the thesis of the existence of a 
Macedonian nation as a historical entity, since minorities were regarded as 
integral part of nations in the Balkans. Besides, Bulgaria feared Yugoslavia’s 
3 See Spyridon Sfetas, Η διαμόρφωση της Σλαβομακεδονικής ταυτότητας. Μια επώδυνη 
διαδικασία [The configuration of Slavo-Macedonian identity. A painful process] (Thes-
saloniki: Vanias, 2003), 91–138.
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territorial claims in the name of Macedonism. The fear of territorial expan-
sionism was not without a precedent, given the events of 1944–48.
In 1956–58 a new friction marred Soviet-Yugoslav relations, main-
ly because of the Hungarian issue. But Soviet-Yugoslav relations entered a 
new phase of improvement because of Yugoslavia’s determination to sup-
port Soviet positions on international issues. Showing flexibility, Tito en-
dorsed the Soviet position on the German issue and condemned China’s 
adventurism and the American spy war against the Soviet Union. Thus, an-
other noticeable rapprochement between Belgrade and Moscow took place 
in 1961–62.4
When Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist 
Party, took office as Prime Minister in 1962 and consolidated his positions, 
he decided to carve out a clear policy on the Macedonian Question, no 
matter what Yugoslav-Soviet relations were or would be like in the future. 
Under Zhivkov’s prodding in March 1963, the Plenum of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party elaborated some theses that would serve as a basis of the 
Bulgarian policy on the Macedonian Question, irrespective of the state of 
Soviet-Yugoslav relations: 1) There is no Macedonian nation as a historical 
entity. 2) The falsification of Bulgaria’s history by the historians in Skopje 
and the creation of the Macedonian nation on an anti-Bulgarian basis are 
unacceptable. 3) There is no Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. 4) A Mac-
edonian national awareness is being built in the People’s Republic of Mac-
edonia, but it is due to political conditions that favoured the mutation of 
the Bulgarians into Macedonians.5 According to Zhivkov, the Soviet leader 
Nikita Khrushchev had not been informed about Bulgaria’s decision to raise 
this question at the Bulgarian Communist Party’s Plenum.6
These tenets were the cornerstone of Bulgaria’s policy on the Mac-
edonian Question in Zhivkov’s era. Moreover, the Bulgarian leader raised 
the question of those Bulgarians in Yugoslav Macedonia who opposed 
Macedonism; i.e. he hinted at the existence of a Bulgarian minority as a 
counterbalance to the supposed Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. Since 
Soviet-Yugoslav relations were noticeably improved, both Sofia and Bel-
grade decided to avoid discussing the Macedonian Question at official bi-
4 See DjokoTripković, “Poboljšanje jugoslovensko-sovjetskih odnosa 1961/62. godine”, 
Tokovi istorije 3-4 (2008), 76–97. For some aspects of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy in the 
Cold War until 1961, see Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu, ed. Aleksandar Životić (Belgrade: 
Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2010), and Vojislav G. Pavlović, ed., The Balkans in the 
Cold War. Balkan Federations, Cominform, Yugoslav-Soviet Conflict (Belgrade: Institute 
for Balkan Studies, 2011).
5 See Sfetas, Το Μακεδονικό και η Βουλγαρία, 102–128.
6 See Todor Zhivkov, Memoari (Sofia: Siv Ad, 1997), 455.
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lateral meetings. It was historians’ task to investigate the historical aspects 
of the Macedonian Question and the roots of the Macedonian nation. 
This was confirmed during the meeting between Todor Zhivkov and Krste 
Crvenkovski, President of the League of Communists of Yugoslav Mac-
edonia (May 1967, in Sofia), and between Tito and Zhivkov ( June 1967, in 
Belgrade) as well.7
In the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War ( June 1967) Yugoslavia behaved 
as if she were a member of the Warsaw Pact. Tito gave permission to Soviet 
airplanes to fly over Yugoslavia’s airspace to provide military assistance to 
Arabs, and to use Yugoslavia’s military airports to refuel. Like the other so-
cialist countries, Yugoslavia broke diplomatic relations with Israel.8
However, after Alexander Ranković’s removal from power ( July 
1966), a decentralisation process was in full swing in Yugoslavia. The Fed-
eral Republics were granted more autonomy, which resulted in the resur-
gence of nationalism with ethnic and economic undertones.9 In Croatia, the 
movement known as the “Croatian Spring” occurred.10 In Yugoslav Mac-
edonia, an “Autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church” was established 
by the Communist authorities in July 1967. Undoubtedly, it was a political 
move and served the nation-building process. (The Macedonian Orthodox 
Church has not been recognised by the other Orthodox Churches till this 
day.11) The same year the foundations of the Macedonian Academy of Sci-
ences and Arts were laid. Although Bulgaria did not protest strongly in 
1967 due to Yugoslavia’s pro-Soviet attitude towards the developments in 
the Middle East, it was keeping track of the new developments in Yugoslav 
Macedonia and decided to give a cultural response. In December 1967 the 
Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party worked out some theses on the 
7 See Veselin Angelov, “Dokumenti. Makedonskiiat vupros v bulgaro-iugoslavskite 
otnosheniia spored provedeni razgovori i razmeni poslaniia mezhdu Todor Zhivkov i 
Josip Broz Tito (1965–1973 g)”, Izvestiia na Durzhavnite Arkhivi 87(2004), 83.
8 See Dragan Bogetić, “Približavanje socijalističkom lageru tokom arapsko-izraelskog 
rata 1967. godine”, Tokovi istorije 3-4 (2008), 89–116.
9 On the internal situation in Yugoslavia, see Branko Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 
1918–1988, vol. 3 Socijalistička Jugoslavija 1945–1988 (Belgrade: Nolit, 1988), 388–
417.
10 See Ludwig Steindorff, “Der Kroatische Frühling. Eine soziale Bewegung in einer 
sozialistischen Gesellshaft”, in Jürgen Elvert, ed., Der Balkan. Eine europäische Kriegsre-
gion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997), 197–210. 
11 On this subject, see Charalambos K. Papastathis, “L’autocéphalie de l’église de la 
Macédoine yougoslave”, Balkan Studies 8 (1967), 151–154.
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patriotic upbringing of the Bulgarian youth.12 An essential element of the 
new national doctrine was the proclamation of the Third of March and the 
Second of August as Days of National Celebration, the anniversary of the 
signing of the Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878) and the anniversary 
of the Ilinden Uprising (2 August 1903) respectively. Both events were as-
sociated with Macedonia. According to the Bulgarian interpretation, under 
the Treaty of San Stefano Bulgaria’s ethnic borders coincided with its state 
borders. The revision of this Treaty at the Congress of Berlin (13 June – 13 
July 1878) had been a historic injustice since the Bulgarians in Macedonia 
had been abandoned to the Ottoman yoke.13 The Ilinden Uprising was also 
claimed as a Bulgarian historical legacy. The manifestations in Bulgaria on 
the occasion of the Third of March were branded in Belgrade and Skopje as 
“a revival of Greater-Bulgarian chauvinism” and as an expression of its terri-
torial claims on Yugoslav Macedonia. In February 1968, Radio Sofia ceased 
broadcasting in the Macedonian language which, according to the Bulgar-
ian interpretation, was a Bulgarian dialect. The events in Czechoslovakia 
in August 1968 shrouded the Bulgarian-Yugoslav conflict over Macedonia 
with ideological and political terms.14
Bulgaria participated in the Warsaw Pact’s intervention in Czech-
oslovakia to put an end to Alexander Dubček’s open-minded policy for 
socialism with a human face. In contrast, Yugoslavia and Romania sup-
ported Dubček’s reforms and condemned the Soviet military intervention 
in Czechoslovakia.15 It was a matter of principle for both countries to speak 
out against foreign intervention. The Warsaw Pact’s ruthless attitude towards 
Czechoslovakia caused alarm in Yugoslavia. Tito ordered partial military 
mobilisation and Yugoslav troops were on alert. When, in September 1968, 
12 Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia, hereafter AJ], Kabinet Predsednika Repub-
like [Office of the President of the Republic, hereafter KPR], fond 837/1-3-a/14-17: 
Information on the state of Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
13 May 1969, p. 73.
13 See “Das Mazedonien Problem-neu gestell?”, Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa 
12/3 (1968), 34.
14 For general information on the Bulgarian-Yugoslav dispute over the Macedonian 
Question after 1967, see Spyridon Sfetas, O Ακήρυκτος Πόλεμος για το Μακεδονικό. 
Βουλγαρία-Γιουγκοσλαβία 1968–1989 [The undeclared war on Macedonia. Bulgaria-
Yugoslavia 1968–1989] (Thessaloniki: Society for Macedonian Studies & Bulgarian 
States Archives, 2010). See also, Stojan Germanov, Makedonskiiat vupros 1944–1989. 
Vuznikvane, evoliutsiia, suvremennost (Sofia: Makedonski nauchen institut, 2012), 169–
250. For a still useful old monograph, see Stefan Troebst, Die bulgarisch-jugoslawische 
Kontroverse um Makedonien 1967–1982 (Munich: Oldenburg Verlag, 1983).
15 For Yugoslavia’s reaction, see Djoko Tripković, “Medjunarodni položaj Jugoslavije i 
vojna intervencija u Čehoslovačkoj 1968”, Istorija 20.veka 1 (2008), 115–130.
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Leonid Brezhnev announced his doctrine of the limited sovereignty of so-
cialist countries and the irreversibility of socialism, the Yugoslav govern-
ment drew up a law on general people’s resistance and guerrilla war in case 
of the Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia. 16 The bill was passed in Parliament in 
November 1968, and Yugoslavia accused the Soviet Union of hegemony.
Under these circumstances, Bulgaria embarked on a large-scale anti-
Yugoslav propaganda campaign, placing the Macedonian Question at its 
centre. Articles in the Bulgarian press on the Bulgarian army’s great contri-
bution to the liberation of Serbia and Yugoslav Macedonia in 1944 caused 
consternation in Belgrade. The Yugoslav leadership was aware that the So-
viet army had liberated Belgrade and parts of Serbia in October 1944. Dur-
ing his hasty visit to Moscow in September 1944, Tito had asked Stalin 
and Molotov for military aid,17 since the Yugoslav partisans were unable to 
defeat the well-equipped German forces in Serbia, where the royalist chet-
niks of Draža Mihailović had influence. Stalin had granted Tito’s request in 
order to gain ground in the new Yugoslavia, but he insisted that the Bulgar-
ian army, already under Soviet control, should participate in the military 
operations in a bid to free this army of the stigma of being a fascist army. 
Indeed, the Soviets contributed heavily to Belgrade’s liberation in October 
1944, and Bulgarians, though undesirable for the Yugoslav partisans, fought 
in the battles for the liberation Skopje in November 1944. According to 
the Yugoslav interpretation, by raising these old issues Bulgaria aimed to 
write off the atrocities that Bulgarian troops had committed in occupied 
Yugoslavia. In the light of Brezhnev’s doctrine, she wanted to pave the way 
for military intervention in Yugoslavia to wrest Macedonia away from the 
Yugoslav federation on the pretext of saving socialism from deviations, Yu-
goslavia’s non-aligned foreign policy and self-management socialism being 
alien to the Soviet Union.
In November 1968, the Institute for History of the Bulgarian Acade-
my of Sciences issued a historical-political essay on the Macedonian Ques-
tion. It recycled the well-known Bulgarian positions: 1) that two-thirds 
of the population of Vardar-Macedonia are of Bulgarian ethnic origin, 
and subjected to a policy of national mutation for the sake of one artifi-
cial Macedonism at all levels; 2) that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia 
16 See Mile Bjelajac, Diplomatija i vojska. Srbija i Jugoslavija 1901–1999 (Belgrade: 
Medija Centar “Odbrana”& Akademija za diplomatiju i bezbednost, 2010), 241–250.
17 See Nikola Popović, “Prvi Titov susret sa Staljinom”, in Oslobodjenje Beograda, ed. 
Aleksandar Životić (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2010), 147–158, and in 
the same volume: Momčilo Mitrović, “Beograd 20. oktobra 1944. godine”, 159–167; cf. 
also Georgi Daskalov, “Sporazumenieto v Kraiova ot 5 oktombri 1948 g.”, Istoricheski 
pregled 6 (1980), 62–74.
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adopted the thesis of the Serbian bourgeoisie that the Macedonian Slavs 
are a separate nation, abandoning its former and correct position, which is 
a United and Independent Macedonia of the Macedonian people, i.e. all 
nationalities living in Macedonia; 3) Bulgarian historians admitted the mis-
takes the Bulgarian Communists made in 1944–48 when they, acting under 
pressure, instructed the population in Pirin Macedonia to declare them-
selves as Macedonians during the census of 1946, thus enforcing upon them 
a type of cultural autonomy. The Bulgarian Communist Party corrected the 
mistakes. During the census in 1965 everybody in Pirin Macedonia had 
the right of self-determination, but very few people declared themselves as 
Macedonians.18 
The conclusion was quite striking. It sent a political message as part 
of the psychological war Bulgaria waged against Yugoslavia. 
The Bulgarian Communist Party regards the Macedonian Question as an 
onerous legacy of the past, as a result of the machinations of the Imperialist 
Powers. But nowadays the crucial question affecting the relations between 
the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and the People’s Republic of 
Bulgaria is not the Macedonian Question, but their cooperation in build-
ing Socialism. It is necessary to work on the consolidation of friendship 
between the peoples of our countries, on the unity of all Balkan Socialist 
countries, it is necessary to approach the Soviet-Union. On this depends 
our success on the way to progress, to peace, to democracy, to socialism, on 
this depends the containment of NATO’s and international imperialism’s 
plans in the Balkans.19
Capitalising on the tension in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, Bulgaria, as 
an active member of the Warsaw Pact, highlighted her own role in defend-
ing the interests of the socialist camp in the Balkans and the Middle East. 
In a Bulgarian military review Bulgaria’s role was commented as follows:
The Warsaw Pact is a guarantee of the preservation of the achievements of 
the socialist countries. Their armies, with the invincible Soviet army, are a 
gigantic power against imperialism. They prevent imperialism from stir-
ring up a new, third world war. The Bulgarian People’s Army, as one of the 
Warsaw Pact member countries, defends the interests of socialism in the 
Balkans and in the Middle East, fulfilling her mission, national as well as 
international…20
18 Istoriko-politicheska spravka po Makedonskiiat Vupros (Sofia: Institut za istoriia pri 
BAN, 1968), 1–26.
19 Ibid. 32.
20 See Velko Palin, “Vissh printsip v stroitelstvo na BNA”, Armeiski komunist 23/9 
(1969), 14.
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On 2 August 1969 in Skopje, Tito, speaking in Parliament, charac-
terised Bulgaria’s refusal to recognise the Macedonian nation as a continu-
ation of her old policy and sent a stern warning that “every attack on the 
Macedonian people is an attack on all Yugoslav peoples. Every attack on 
the Socialist Republic of Macedonia is an immediate attack on the Socialist 
Yugoslavia as a whole”.21
Tito’s reference to Soviet hegemony, even after the “normalisation” of 
the situation in Czechoslovakia, provoked Soviet reactions. In September 
1969 Andrei Gromyko visited Belgrade to clear up the misunderstanding. 
Speaking to the Soviet foreign minister, Tito condemned the Soviet mili-
tary intervention in Czechoslovakia and pointed out that the crisis in that 
country should have been settled by political means. Gromyko replied that 
the Soviet leadership had thought of a political solution in Czechoslovakia, 
but opted for a different one after anti-Soviet protests.22 Tito did not fail 
to mention the Bulgarian-Yugoslav dispute over the Macedonian Question, 
criticising Bulgaria’s negation of the Macedonian nation and the claims ex-
pressed in the Bulgarian press that Bulgaria had put up resistance to fascism 
as early as 1941and that the Bulgarian army had liberated Yugoslavia.23 Gro-
myko replied that the Soviet Union was following the Bulgarian-Yugoslav 
controversy over Macedonia, but did not want to interfere in their bilateral 
relations. At any rate, the Soviet foreign minister stressed that the polemic 
between two socialist countries did not serve the interests of socialism.24
Gromyko’s visit to Belgrade did not improve Soviet-Yugoslav rela-
tions, since Tito was still suspicious about Moscow’s plans regarding Yu-
goslavia. Following Gromyko’s visit to Yugoslavia, Ivan Bashev, Bulgarian 
foreign minister, came to Yugoslavia in December 1969 at the invitation of 
the Yugoslav foreign minister, Mirko Tepavac. He was received by Tito on 
12 December. Yugoslavia’s leader made it clear to Bashev that the Macedo-
nian nation existed, that it had proved its existence in the resistance against 
fascism and in the creation of socialism. He saw a political expediency be-
hind the articles in the Bulgarian press about the alleged contribution of 
the Bulgarian army to Yugoslavia’s liberation. Bulgaria tried to play down 
21 See J. B. Tito “Preku osvoboditelnata borba i socijalistička revolucija makedon-
skiot narod izrazuvaše vo slobodna nacija”, Glasnik na Institutot za nacionalna istorija 
13/3(1969), 10.
22 AJ, KPR, f. 837/1-3a/101-113: Note on the talks between Tito and the USSR Min-




Yugoslavia’s resistance, Tito concluded.25 Bashev replied that Bulgaria did 
not intend to underestimate Yugoslavia’s resistance against fascism; on the 
contrary, she highly appreciated the common Bulgarian-Yugoslav struggle 
against fascism, but many publications in Yugoslavia failed to draw a clear 
distinction between the Bulgarian fascist government and the Bulgarian 
people. As for the Macedonian Question, he referred to the oral agree-
ment, reached by Tito and Zhivkov in 1967, that the Macedonian Question 
should not affect bilateral relations, and stressed the need for a new meeting 
between the two leaders.26
Negotiations between Bashev and Tepavac did not yield any results. 
Bulgaria was not interested in improving her relations with Yugoslavia as 
long as Soviet-Yugoslav relations were stalled. The proposal Zhivkov made 
to Tito in the following period with the view to bypassing the Macedonian 
Question was as follows: Bulgaria was to accept that the Macedonians in the 
Socialist Republic of Macedonia had already shaped their national identity, 
and Yugoslavia was to give up any claim to the Bulgarian part of Macedo-
nia, and to stop raising the question of a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria.27 
But Yugoslavia rejected this deal. Even if Bulgaria accepted that the Slavic 
population in Yugoslav Macedonia had developed a national identity after 
1944, the Bulgarian historical science contested the historical dimension of 
the Macedonian nation. The burning question was that history intertwined 
with politics. On the other hand, the Macedonian minority was perceived 
in Yugoslavia as an integral part of the Macedonian nation and, therefore, 
Yugoslav authorities could not help broaching this matter.
To counterbalance the potential Soviet threat, Tito boosted Yugosla-
via’s relations with the US and China. Soviet-Chinese relations were partic-
ularly tense in 1969–70, and not only for ideological, but also for territorial 
reasons. The US was already on track to normalise relations with China.28 
In August 1970, Chinese-Yugoslav diplomatic relations were elevated to the 
ambassadorial level. In September 1970, US President Richard Nixon vis-
ited Yugoslavia. It was the first ever visit of a president of the United States 
to Yugoslavia. Tito and Nixon discussed international questions, focusing 
25 AJ, KPR, f. 837/1-3-a/14-17: Note on the talks between President Tito and the Bul-
garian Minister of Foreign Affairs Bashev, 12 Dec. 1969.
26 Ibid.
27 AJ, KPR, f. 837/1-3-1-a/14-18: Foreign Affairs Group. Reminder. Audience of the 
Ambassador of PR Bulgaria with Comrade President. Ambassador bringing the reply 
of the Prime Minister and First Secretary of the CPB CC Todor Zhivkov to Comrade 
President’s letter of 10 Dec. 1970, Brioni, 22 Dec. 1970.
28  See Yafeng Xia, “China’s Elite Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement, January 
1969 – February 1972”, Journal of Cold War Studies 8/4 (2006), 3–28.
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particularly on the Middle East after Nasser’s death, and on China. Tito 
reiterated the well-known Yugoslav position on the settlement of the Pales-
tinian issue (Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories, the creation 
of a Palestinian state, but also recognition of Israel by Arabs), and expressed 
dissatisfaction with the presence of the American 6th Fleet as well as the 
Soviet fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.29 At a personal meeting with 
Nixon, Tito called on the American President to boost American-Chinese 
relations and to help China overcome her isolation and become a member 
of the United Nations, but not to the detriment of the Soviet Union.30 With 
the support of the non-aligned countries, China became a member of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations and a Permanent Member of the 
Security Council in October 1971. The American-Chinese rapprochement 
brought about the resumption of Greek-Albanian and Greek-Chinese dip-
lomatic relations as well. Greece and Albania had been in a state of war 
since 1940. In view of Brezhnev’s doctrine, the Greek military regime did 
not rule out Soviet intervention in Albania after her formal withdrawal 
from the Warsaw Pact. In case of the Eastern European countries’ inva-
sion of Yugoslavia by land and air, and the simultaneous naval operations 
of the Soviet fleet on the Albanian coast, Greece’s security would be in 
jeopardy. In that case, the Albanian communist government expected that 
Greece, under the pretext of protecting the Greek minority in North Epi-
rus, could invade south Albania to safeguard strategic positions.31 Early in 
1971, Greece and Albania started covert negotiations under the auspices of 
the United Nations, which resulted in the restoration of Greek-Albanian 
diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level in May 1971. However, the 
state of war was not lifted, and neither were the rights of the Greek minor-
ity recognised in a special Greek-Albanian treaty. Security reasons overrode 
the outstanding bilateral questions. In fact, Greece renounced any territo-
rial claims to Albania and believed that the new situation would benefit 
the Greek minority. Complying with the American policy, Greece estab-
lished diplomatic relations with China in June 1972. Greece also gave the 
right to the American Sixth Fleet to harbour permanently in Greek ports 
in the Aegean. Greece’s Balkan policy served NATO’s interests and had a 
clear-cut anti-Soviet connotation. Albania stood on its Yugoslav positions 
29 AJ, KPR, f. 837/1-3-a: Note on the talks of the President of the Republic with US 
President Richard Nixon on 1 Oct. 1970 in Belgrade.
30 Ibid. For Nixon’s visit to Yugoslavia in general, see Dragan Bogetić, “Niksonova po-
seta Jugoslaviji 1970 – novi američki prilaz politici i pokretu nesvrstanih”, Arhiv 8/1-2 
(2007), 165–178.
31 Bekir Meta, Shipëria dhe Grecia. Paqja e vështirë [Albania and Greece. The uneasy 
peace] (Tirana: Shtepia Botuese Koçi, 2004), 217–218.
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regarding the Macedonian Question. No wonder that Bulgaria saw China’s 
international role as a threat to Soviet interests in the Balkans.32 Albania 
was China’s outpost in the Balkans. The Albanian leader, Enver Hoxha, had 
inaugurated an “egalitarian cultural revolution”, taking his cue from Mao’s 
China.33 However, due to the distance between Albania and China, Peking 
was not bound by any military agreement to defend Albania in case of an 
emergency.
Brezhnev, realising that Yugoslavia’s pro-western orientation could 
endanger Soviet interests, rushed to Belgrade in September 1971, in a bid 
to come to terms with Tito. He made it clear to Tito that the so-called Br-
ezhnev’s doctrine was not applicable to the Yugoslav case, and proposed a 
Soviet-Yugoslav treaty of friendship without insisting on Yugoslavia’s mem-
bership in the Warsaw Pact. Tito turned down Brezhnev’s proposal, arguing 
that friendship should be proven in practice.34 He did not fail to mention 
the Macedonian Question. He drew Brezhnev’s attention to the Bulgarian-
Yugoslav dispute on the Macedonian Question, pointing out that Bulgaria’s 
negation of the Macedonian nation was pointless.35 Brezhnev’s visit brought 
no results. Yugoslavia’s leader did not rule out the possibility that the Soviet 
Union could exploit Yugoslavia’s internal crisis in 1971 (“Croatian Spring” 
had reached its peak, and, in general, the Federal Republics were heading 
for decentralisation and liberalism; the Croatian emigration was active in 
its anti-Yugoslav, anti-communist policy). On the eve of Brezhnev’s visit to 
Yugoslavia, military manoeuvres conducted in Eastern Europe were a cause 
of concern in Yugoslavia. In October 1971, Tito visited the United States. 
In his meeting with Nixon he discussed international matters, such as rela-
tions between India and Pakistan, the Middle Eastern situation, Vietnam, 
China etc. Regarding Soviet-Yugoslav relations, Tito stressed that Yugosla-
via’s independent policy was a thorn in the Soviet side, but, little by little, 
the Soviets were coming to adjust themselves to change, without, however, 
allowing the members of the Warsaw Pact to leave their orbit.36
32 Ivan Bashev, Politik, durzhavnik, diplomat, eds. S. Bakish et al. (Sofia: Universitetsko 
izd. Sv. Kliment Okhridski, 2009), 147–149.
33 Valentina Duka, Histori e Shqipërisë 1912–2000 [History of Albania 1912–2000] (Ti-
rana: Shtëpia Botuese “Kristalina-KH”, 2007), 281–287. 
34 AJ, KPR, f. 837/1-3-a/14-18: Speech of President Tito at the meeting of the Execu-
tive Bureau of the LCY Presidency of 3 Oct. in Brioni.
35 Ibid.
36 See Memorandum for the President’s files, Washington, 30 Oct. 1971. Subject: Meet-
ing between President Nixon and President Tito, Foreign Relations of the United States 
[FRUS], 1969–1976. Vol. XXIX. Eastern Europe, Eastern Mediterranean 1969–1972, 
eds. J. E. Miller et al. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2007), 
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Although Soviet-Yugoslav relations were still stalled, Brezhnev’s 
visit to Yugoslavia, if unsuccessful, indicated Moscow’s willingness to im-
prove the situation. The main reason was Yugoslavia’s increasing role in the 
Middle East and in the non-aligned movement. After Nehru’s and Nasser’s 
death, Tito became the only leader of the non-aligned movement. Besides, 
the situation in the Middle East was deteriorating after the “Black Septem-
ber” of 1970. The Soviet Union’s naval presence in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean became more impressive. The Soviets needed Yugoslavia’s airspace 
to assure the provision of military supplies to Arabs in case of a new war in 
the Middle East. After Belgrade, Brezhnev visited Sofia in late September 
1971, where he draw Zhivkov’s attention to Yugoslavia’s pivotal role in the 
non-aligned movement and the fact that it sided with the Soviet Union in 
the common struggle against imperialism and colonialism.37 He hoped that 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia would establish closer relations in view 
of the preparations for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe.38 For obvious reasons, Yugoslavia supported the Soviet initiative to 
discuss security and co-operation issues within the framework of an inter-
national conference. For the Soviets, it was an opportunity to allay Western 
suspicions about Brezhnev’s doctrine. But in his meeting with Zhivkov, the 
Soviet leader did not refer to Tito’s scathing criticism of Bulgaria regarding 
the Macedonian Question. Seeking to bridge the gap between Moscow and 
Belgrade, Brezhnev obviously did not want to stir up new troubles in rela-
tions between Sofia and Belgrade. Even so, Brezhnev’s visit to Yugoslavia 
had an impact on Bulgaria. In late 1971, Bulgaria’s public anti-Yugoslav 
campaign gradually subsided, but the Bulgarian leadership persisted in its 
stance on the Macedonian minority. When Stane Dolanc visited Bulgaria 
in February 1973, Todor Zhivkov reiterated the well-known rigid Bulgarian 
theses, without showing any sign of flexibility.39
Marshal Tito, taking into account the global economic crisis in 1972–
73, avoided pushing Soviet-Yugoslav relations to the edge. The convertibil-
593. For Tito’s visit to the Unites States in general, see Dragan Bogetić, “Razgovori 
Tito-Nikson 1971 – politička implikacija Vašingtonske deklaracije”, Istorija 20. veka 
29/2 (2011), 159–172.
37 Tsentralen Durzhaven Arkhiv [Central State Archives, hereafter CDA], fond 1B, 
opis 60, arkhivna edinica 83: Meeting between Dr. Todor Zhivkov – First Secretary of 
the CPB CC and Dr. Leonid Brezhnev – Secretary General of the SUCP CC, Sofia, 
27/9/1971.
38 Ibid.
39 CDA, f. 1B, op. 60, a.e. 106: Talks between Dr. Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the 
CPB CC, and Dr. Stane Dolanc, Secretary of the Executive Bureau of the LCY Presi-
dency, 20 Feb. 1973.
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ity of the dollar to gold had underlain the international monetary system 
since the Breton Woods Agreement of 1944. After the US government sus-
pended the convertibility of the dollar to gold in 1971, there ensued a wave 
of competitive devaluations, which contributed to inflation in many Euro-
pean countries. The international oil crisis in 1973 forced Tito to show more 
flexibility, since the Soviet Union was Yugoslavia’s basic trade partner. In the 
aftermath of the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, Arab states failed to 
boycott some countries that were seen as supporters of Israel, but succeeded 
in pushing up the price of oil. In the last three months of 1973, the oil price 
quadrupled. The oil price rises had severe effects on the countries that had 
few internal sources of energy. Besides, Tito had smashed the “Croatian 
Spring” by late 1971. In 1972, the liberal opposition in Yugoslavia was to-
tally defeated. Yugoslavia overcame its internal crisis, but only temporarily, 
since the main cause of the crisis was the chronic, simmering national ques-
tion under the guise of decentralisation. When Tito visited Moscow in June 
1972, the focus of his talks with Brezhnev was on economic matters.40
Sensing an incipient thawing in relations between Belgrade and 
Moscow, Bulgaria decided to tighten its political, economic and cultural 
bonds with the Soviet Union to counterbalance a possible Soviet-Yugoslav 
rapprochement. This spirit permeated the Plenum of the Central Commit-
tee of the Bulgarian Communist Party held in Sofia in July 1973. However, 
the Resolutions of the Plenum did not raise the question of Bulgaria’s union 
with the Soviet Union.41
In the aftermath of the July Plenum, Brezhnev visited Bulgaria again 
in September 1973. In a private meeting at the “Voden” residence, Zhivkov 
and Brezhnev discussed many issues concerning bilateral relations and Bul-
garia’s Balkan policy.42 In this context, Zhivkov’s aggressiveness against Yu-
goslavia and Tito seemed striking. The Bulgarian leader accused Yugoslavia 
of laying territorial claims to Bulgaria after the Second World War. He de-
scribed the Bulgarian-Yugoslav negotiations about a South-Slav federation, 
conducted in 1944–48, as an attempt by Yugoslavia to swallow Bulgaria, 
since the federation was not planned on the principle of equality. Even 
40 AJ, KPR, f. I-2/53: Steno notes of the talks between SFRY President Josip Broz 
Tito and CPSU CC Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev of 6 June 1972 at 11 a.m. at 
Kremlin.
41 CDA, f. 1B, op. 58, a.e. 81: Steno notes from the plenary session of the CPB CC, 
17–19 July 1973. In 1963, Zhivkov had suggested to the Soviet Union that Bulgaria 
should become a Soviet Republic. See Iskra Baeva, Bulgaria i Iztochna Evropa (Sofia: 
Paradigma, 2001), 111–117.
42 CDA, f. IB, op. 58, a.e. 90: Talks of Dr. Todor Zhivkov and Dr. Leonid Brezhnev at 
the government residence “Voden”, 20/9/1973.
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Georgi Dimitrov had been unable to see through Yugoslavia’s game; he had 
granted cultural autonomy to the Bulgarians in the Pirin region to convert 
them to Macedonians and allowed agents from Skopje to launch nation-
alistic agitation there, Zhivkov stressed. It was Stalin who had thwarted 
Tito’s plans and saved Bulgaria from sinking into the Yugoslav federation 
under unfavourable conditions, he concluded. Switching to the issue of Yu-
goslavia’s present Balkan policy, Zhivkov underscored that she tried to un-
dermine Soviet policy and to force some countries to join the non-aligned 
movement.43
In the light of the developments in 1973, it is not difficult to under-
stand the reasons that motivated the Bulgarian leader to launch this on-
slaught against Yugoslavia. Given the improvement of relations between 
Moscow and Belgrade, and Yugoslavia’s increasing geostrategic role in the 
Middle East, Zhivkov feared that Yugoslavia, now able to speak from an 
advantageous position, might urge the Soviet Union to exert pressure on 
Bulgaria to recognise the Macedonian minority. Besides, Yugoslavia in-
tended to raise the minorities question at the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe in Helsinki in July 1973.
Even if Brezhnev was taken aback by Zhivkov’s attack on Yugoslavia, 
he seemed neither to agree nor disagree. At any rate, he thanked Zhivkov for 
providing this information and promised to update Alexei Kosygin on the 
situation in the Balkans pending his visit to Yugoslavia and his first meeting 
with Tito.44 It is clear that Brezhnev did not give up the Soviet policy of 
equidistance from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in their dispute over Macedonia; 
i.e. to accept the Macedonian nation in Yugoslavia, like the Moldavian na-
tion in the Soviet Union, but to deny the existence of a Macedonian minor-
ity in Bulgaria. Moscow strenuously opposed Yugoslavia’s plan to broach 
the question of minorities in Helsinki.
In late September 1973, the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin visited 
Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo and Skopje. In the meeting between Kosygin 
and Tito on the island of Brioni, many questions were raised regarding in-
ternational and bilateral relations.45 The Soviet Union was ready to supply 
Yugoslavia with oil and natural gas, which was of paramount importance for 
Yugoslavia in view of the approaching world energy crisis. A Soviet loan for 
the growth of the Yugoslav industry was also announced.46 Keeping in mind 
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 AJ, KPR, f. 837/1-3-a/101-148: Note on the talks between President of the Republic 
Josip Broz Tito and President of the Soviet Government Alexei Kosygin of 28 Sept. 
1973 in Brioni.
46 See Milan Skakun, Balkan i velike sile (Belgrade: Tribina, 1982), 158.
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the Bulgarian-Yugoslav dispute over the Macedonian Question, Kosygin 
praised the achievements of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia during his 
visit to Skopje, but avoided any reference to the Macedonian people. 47
In the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, Yugoslavia gave permission 
to Soviet airplanes to fly over her airspace and to use her airports. During 
Tito’s visit to the Soviet Union in November 1973, the improvement of 
Soviet-Yugoslav relations was noticeable. Brezhnev expressed his gratitude 
to Tito for Yugoslavia’s attitude during the Middle East crisis and assured 
him of the Soviet Union’s determination to boost economic cooperation 
with Yugoslavia.48 In the following years the Soviet Union was the main 
trade partner of Yugoslavia, through the system of clearing.
As for the Macedonian Question, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia held their 
own respective positions. Yugoslavia kept raising the question of the Mace-
donian minority in Bulgaria, and in Greece as well. Under the new Yugoslav 
Constitution, which entered into force in early 1974, the Socialist Republic 
of Macedonia was granted broader powers and was entitled to raise the 
Macedonian Question independently of the federal government. In fact, 
foreign policy was framed in the Yugoslav republics, and the federal govern-
ment was only to implement it.
Zhivkov met Tito and Edvard Kardelj in Helsinki, on the occasion 
of the signing of the Final Act of the CSCE on 1 August 1975. The Mace-
donian Question was raised again. Kardelj admitted that Bulgaria had rec-
ognised the Socialist Republic of Macedonia as a state, but the crux of the 
matter was Bulgaria’s reluctance to recognise Macedonian identity and its 
historical roots.49 Zhivkov replied that Bulgaria had in fact recognised both 
the Macedonian state and identity, but only within Yugoslavia; she rejected 
Yugoslavia’s claim on the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria because such 
a group was non-existent. Eventually, both sides agreed to set up a scien-
tific commission to research the historical dimension of the Macedonian 
Question and the roots of the Macedonian nation. The two parties were to 
take into consideration the views and proposals of historians. Since Zhivkov 
had not visited Belgrade for a long time, the two foreign ministers of the 
two countries were to re-establish contact to prepare a summit meeting be-
47 “Aleksej Kosigin posetio Makedoniju. Jugoslovenska ostvarenja – deo borbe za soci-
jalizam u svetu”, Politika, Belgrade, 27 Sept. 1973, p. 1.
48 AJ, KPR, f. 837/1-2/55: Steno notes of the talks between President of LCY and 
SFRY Josip Broz Tito and Secretary General of CPSU Leonid Brezhnev of 12 and 13 
Nov. 1973 in Kiev.
49 Novica Veljanovski & Jan Rihlik, eds. Čehoslovački diplomatski dokumenti za Make-
donija (1939–1975) (Skopje: Državen arhiv na Republika Makedonija, 2008), vol. III, 
460.
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tween Tito and Zhivkov.50 Judging by the past experience, this gentleman’s 
agreement in Helsinki was not meaningful; neither side could wait for the 
verdict of historians to carve out its policy. Bulgaria precluded every effort 
of Yugoslavia to internationalise the question of the Macedonian minority 
after the Final Act of Helsinki under the pretext of the human rights issue. 
The definitive settlement of the Trieste question between Yugoslavia and 
Italy in November 1975 contained some terms regarding the protection 
of the rights of the Italian and Slovenian minorities respectively. It was a 
precedent for Bulgaria.
In Novermber 1975, the Bulgarian foreign minister Petur Mladenov 
visited Belgrade. He suggested to his Yugoslav counterpart, Miloš Minić, 
that Bulgaria and Yugoslavia might sign a mutual agreement on territorial 
integrity, inviolability of the borders, and non-interference of one country 
into the internal affairs of the other.51 In January 1976, Belgrade accepted 
the Bulgarian proposal in principle, provided that the Parliaments of both 
countries issue a joint declaration on the protection of the rights of the Bul-
garian minority in Serbia and of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria.52 It 
was unacceptable for Bulgaria. Her initiative met with no response in Bel-
grade and proved to be a stillborn policy. Under Bulgaria’s pressure, political 
and national matters were not addressed at the First Balkan Conference 
held at Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis’s initiative in Athens in 
January-February 1976.
A mixed Bulgarian-Yugoslav commission set up in 1976 to tackle bi-
lateral issues did not yield any results. The Macedonian Question overshad-
owed all other questions.53 The Soviet Union stayed away from the dispute. 
Although the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs confidentially made the 
Soviet stance that there was no Macedonian minority in Bulgaria clear to 
Belgrade,54 the Soviet Union did not exert pressure on Yugoslavia to refrain 
from campaigning against Bulgaria regarding the Macedonian Question. 
When Brezhnev visited Yugoslavia again in September 1976, his talks with 
50 Ibid. 460–461.
51 CDA, f. 1B, op. 35, a.e. 5535: Information on the visit of the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs of the PR Bulgaria Petur Mladenov to SFR Yugoslavia on 11–13 Nov. 1975, Sofia, 
17 Nov. 1975.
52 See the brochure prepared by the Yugoslav Tanjung Agency, Jugoslovenski stavovi i 
dokumenti za odnosi so Bugarija (Skopje, July 1978), 17–21.
53 See Stojan Germanov, “Bulgaro-iugoslavskite razgovori po makedonskiia vupros. 
Stenografski protokoli, september 1976g.”, Makedonski pregled 2 (2007), 107–128.
54 AJ, KPR, f. 837/1-3-a/101-148: Information on the USSR and Yugoslav-Soviet rela-
tions for the occasion of the audience of the Prime Minister of the USSR A. Kosygin 
with Comrade President, Brioni, 19 Sept. 1973.     
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the Yugoslav leadership focused only on matters of economic and military 
cooperation. Brezhnev distanced himself from the so-called “Cominform-
ists”, an anti-Titoist group recently smothered by Yugoslav authorities, and 
raised the question of home-porting for Soviet warships in the Adriatic 
Sea.55 Soviet warships should be allowed to anchor in Yugoslav harbours for 
the purpose of maintenance and repair. Yugoslavia made this concession. 
In August 1977, Tito visited the Soviet Union. The Yugoslav delegation 
discussed matters of economic cooperation and international relations with 
the Soviets; only Stane Dolanc referred briefly to Bulgaria’s negation of the 
Socialist Republic of Macedonia.56 Since the Soviet Union pursued a bal-
anced policy towards Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, the two countries had toned 
down their usual harsh language. In September 1977, on the eve of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was to be held 
in Belgrade in October 1977, Bulgaria warned Yugoslavia of negative con-
sequences, should Yugoslavia capitalise on its role as the host country and 
raise the Macedonian Question with her terms on an international level.57
However, the celebrations in Bulgaria in March 1978 of the 100th 
anniversary of the Treaty of San Stefano and their international implica-
tions made the Bulgarian-Yugoslav dispute flare up.
Bulgaria had celebrated the Third of March as the day of her libera-
tion from the Ottomans with the essential support of the Russian army. The 
blame for the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano by the Congress of Berlin 
(1878) was placed on the imperialistic Western powers. In the new political 
circumstances, the celebrations in Bulgaria turned into a manifestation of 
traditional Bulgarian-Russian friendship and of the contemporary Soviet-
Bulgarian alliance. In Yugoslavia, any Bulgarian reference to San Stefano 
was perceived as a revival of the Bulgarian dream of a Greater Bulgaria, with 
Macedonia as a bone of contention. Yugoslavia was not afraid of Bulgaria, 
but of the Soviet Union, which stood behind her as a reliable ally. In this 
respect, airing the Macedonian minority issue was a self-defence policy for 
Yugoslavia. In June 1978, the 11th Congress of the League of Communists 
of Yugoslavia called upon Bulgaria to respect the rights of the Macedonian 
55 AJ, f. 837, K-176, KPR I-2/101-103: Note on the talks between the President of the 
SFRY and President of the LCY Comrade Josip Broz Tito and Secretary General of 
the CPSU CC Leonid Brezhnev of 15 Nov. 1976 at Beli Dvor.
56 AJ, f. 837/K-107/KPR I-2/140-141: Steno notes of the formal talks between the 
President of the SFRY and President of the LCY Josip Broz Tito and Secretary Gen-
eral of the CPSU CC Leonid I. Brezhnev in Moscow-Kremlin, on 17 and 18 Aug. 
1977.
57 See Veljanovski & Rihlik, eds., Diplomatski dokumenti, vol. IV 1976–1989 (2010), 
101–106.
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minority within her borders.58 As a reaction, on 24 July 1978, the Bulgarian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a brochure entitled Multilateral Develop-
ment of Bulgarian-Yugoslav Relations. It repeated the well-known Bulgarian 
view that there was no Macedonian nation as a historical entity and no 
Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, that historians in Skopje distorted Bul-
garian history, that Bulgaria was ready to sign an agreement with Yugoslavia 
on territorial integrity, inviolability of the borders and non-interference of 
one country into the internal affairs of the other country, leaving to histori-
ans the contentious questions.59
Meanwhile the Bulgarian-Yugoslav dispute took international di-
mensions with China’s involvement in the Balkan affairs. After the ter-
mination of the Vietnam War, China competed with the Soviet Union 
for influence in Indochina. In 1978 relations between the two countries 
were strained due to the developments in Indochina. China supported the 
Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, whereas Vietnam relied on the Soviet 
Union. This antagonism was transferred to the Balkans, when China, after 
the total severance of relations between China and Albania in July 1978, 
began to pursue a Balkan policy on an anti-Soviet basis.60 In August 1978, 
Hua Guofeng visited Romania and Yugoslavia to get acquainted with so-
cialism in these countries and to improve economic relations.61 His visit 
to Yugoslavia took place on 21 August. On that day, ten years earlier, the 
Warsaw Pact had invaded Czechoslovakia. The date of the visit was not a 
matter of coincidence. Hua Guofeng did not fail to visit Skopje and raise 
the Macedonian Question. He expressed his admiration for the Macedo-
nian people for their ancient history and glorious historical traditions, paid 
homage to their resistance to foreign occupations in the Second World War 
under Tito’s leadership and praised the modern Socialist Republic of Mace-
donia for its achievements.62 Mihailo Apostolski, President of the Mace-
donian Academy of Sciences and Arts, presented the Chinese leader with 
58 Hans-Joachim Hoppe, “Der bulgarisch-jugoslawische Streit um Makedonien”, Ost-
europa-Archiv 5 (1979), 302.
59 Za vsestranno razvitie na bulgaro-iugoslavskite otnoshenia. Deklaratsia na Ministerstvo-
to na Vunshnite Raboti na Narodna Republika Bulgaria, Sofia 1978. 
60 For the causes of Albania’s rupture with China, see Hysni Myzyri, ed. Historie e 
Shqipërisë dhe e shqiptarëve [History of Albania and Albanians] (Prizren: Sirint, 2001), 
347–351.
61 “Eine Zwischenbilanz nach Hua Kuo-fengs Staatsbesuch in Rumänien und Jugos-
lawien. Chinas Präsenz in Südosteuropa”, Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa 22/8-9 
(1978), 203–217.
62 “Makedonskiot narod ima drevna istorija i slavni revolucionerni tradiciji”, Nova 
Makedonija, Skopje, 25 Aug. 1978, p. 3.
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a three-volume History of the Macedonian People. In Sofia, Hua Guofeng’s 
Balkan tour was perceived as an attempt by China and the US to encircle 
Bulgaria. On the eve of Hua Guofeng’s visit to Romania and Yugoslavia, 
Zhivkov had met Brezhnev in the Crimea. The Bulgarian leader assured 
Brezhnev that Bulgaria supported Vietnam materially due to China’s ag-
gressiveness. He characterised the situation in the Balkans as complicated, 
given the conspiracy against Bulgaria and the Soviet Union hatched by the 
US, NATO and China.63 As for Albania after its rift with China, Zhivkov 
suggested that Bulgaria should win over this country in her search for al-
lies in the Balkans against China. Obviously, Zhivkov envisaged a common 
Bulgarian-Albanian front against China and Yugoslavia. Albania stood up 
for the right of the Kosovo Albanians to have their own federal republic 
in Yugoslavia. Given the new circumstances, she might adopt the Bulgar-
ian position on the Macedonian Question, Zhivkov might have calculated, 
since China’s flirtation with Yugoslavia was one of the causes of the sever-
ance of Albanian-Chinese relations. Brezhnev shared Zhivkov’s concerns 
about China’s policy in Indochina, and in the Balkans as well, but discour-
aged Zhivkov from approaching Albania, unless this country sought Soviet 
tutelage first.64 There were, however, no signs of Albania’s willingness to 
forge a common Albanian-Bulgarian front as an anti-Yugoslav spearhead.
In September 1978, Bulgaria responded again by the publication 
of the volume Macedonia. Documents and Material, a collection of docu-
ments from the medieval period to the Second World War, translated into 
English, aiming to prove that Macedonians were Bulgarians and that there 
was no evidence for a Macedonian nation. When Tito, in his speech in 
Skopje on 6 October 1978, called upon Bulgaria and Greece to respect the 
rights of the Macedonian minority, Bulgaria reacted with a double-edged 
offer. She proposed to Belgrade that an independent foreign commission 
be set up to establish if there was a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, but 
also to inquire into the fate of the Bulgarians in Yugoslav Macedonia after 
the Second World War.65 Expectedly, Yugoslavia declined the proposal as 
inconceivable.
The Bulgarian-Yugoslav dispute was highly politicised when, in De-
cember 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia to topple the ruthless Khmer 
Rouge regime. China responded by invading Vietnam in February 1979. 
Whereas Vietnam’s troops remained in Cambodia for some ten years, Chi-
na’s invasion was not a large-scale operation and after some days her troops 
63 CDA, f. I B, op. 66, a.e. 1373: Information on the friendly meeting between Todor 
Zhivkov and Leonid Brezhnev of 14 Avg. 1978 in the Crimea.
64 Ibid.
65 See Veljanovski & Rihlik, eds., Diplomatski dokumenti, vol. IV, 159–167.
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pulled out of Vietnam. Bulgaria characterised Vietnam’s military action in 
Cambodia as a “liberation movement” and condemned China’s invasion of 
Vietnam; Yugoslavia, in contrast, identified both military events as aggres-
sion. Yugoslavia’s flirtation with China and reluctance to draw a distinction 
between Vietnam’s international solidarity with Cambodia and China’s bel-
ligerence aroused concerns in both Sofia and in Moscow. In January 1979, 
Brezhnev visited Sofia to take a break for a few days, but also to discuss the 
situation in the Balkans and in Indochina with the Bulgarian leadership. In 
his meeting with Brezhnev, Zhivkov expressed his concerns over the un-
holy alliance of Yugoslavia, Romania, China, the United States and NATO 
against Bulgaria: “It is a perturbing process. It unfolds on an anti-Soviet 
and, more naturally, an anti-Bulgarian basis. We can already recognise their 
effort to isolate Bulgaria in the Balkans. Of course, they cannot do it yet, but 
we might become isolated at a given moment. Obviously, measures should 
be taken by both countries, and by the brotherly socialist countries, to re-
inforce our positions in the Balkans.”66 Raising the Macedonian Question 
from the Bulgarian point of view again was a self-defence policy for Bul-
garia. During Brezhnev’s stay in Sofia, Tsola Dragoicheva, a former parti-
san and now member of the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 
published her memoirs.67 Dragoicheva referred to the conflict between the 
Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communist Parties during the Second World War 
and afterwards. She criticised the Yugoslav Communist Party for turning 
the Macedonian Question into a purely Yugoslav question, working to-
wards the unification of the entire region of Macedonia within the Yugoslav 
federation. In fact, she argued, a fair solution to the Macedonian Question 
would be a united and independent Macedonia. She stressed that the popu-
lation in Vardar Macedonia had hailed Bulgarian soldiers as liberators and 
that the Regional Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party had joined 
the Bulgarian Communist Party. She rebuked the Yugoslav Communists 
for their territorial aspirations for the Bulgarian part of Macedonia. The po-
litical message was the following: 1) Bulgaria cannot cut her umbilical cord 
with Vardar Macedonia; 2) the process of the formation of the Macedonian 
nation is a long-term and complicated one, but it does not mean that people 
in Vardar Macedonia should be oblivious of their past and historical bond 
with Bulgaria. In other words, Dragoicheva questioned the legitimacy of 
66 CDA, f. IB, op. 60, a.e. 248: Steno protocol of the meeting of the CPB CC Politburo 
with Dr. Leonid Ilich Brezhnev – Secretary General of the CPSU CC and President of 
the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 13 Jan. 1979.
67 Tsola Dragoicheva, “Na klasovi i internationalisticheski pozitsii”, Septemvri 32/1 
(1979), 5–80.
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the Socialist Republic of Macedonia within Yugoslavia and implied that the 
process of the creation of the Macedonian nation was not irreversible.
Dragoicheva’s Memoirs, which were translated into foreign languag-
es, caused outrage in Yugoslavia. The fact that Dragoicheva, in her capacity 
as President of the Association of Bulgarian-Soviet Friendship, presented 
Brezhnev with a copy of her Memoirs, was interpreted in Yugoslavia as the 
Soviet endorsement of Bulgarian claims. The press in Yugoslavia stigma-
tised Dragoicheva’s Memoirs as “the most outrageous anti-Yugoslav slander 
surpassing all anti-Yugoslav and anti-Macedonian slanderous publications 
in Bulgaria after Second World War”.68 
Vančo Apostolski, editor-in-chief of Nova Makedonija, replied to 
Dragoicheva in a detached academic tone. His arguments were the follow-
ing: 1) the Regional Committee in Yugoslav Macedonia unwittingly broke 
away from the Yugoslav Communist Party and joined the Bulgarian Com-
munist Party; it acted under the pressure of Bulgarian communists, who 
condemned the Bulgarian fascist government only formally; they accepted 
the annexation of Yugoslav Macedonia by the Bulgarian authorities; 2) the 
policy of the Bulgarian Communist Party coincided with that of the Bul-
garian fascists; Bulgarian communists in Yugoslav Macedonia did not call 
upon people to rise up against the Bulgarian army, arguing that there were 
no conditions for armed resistance; 3) the Yugoslav solution of the Macedo-
nian question could be explained by the fact that the Macedonian people 
identified their fate with that of the other Yugoslav peoples; 4) in 1944–48 
the Bulgarian Communist Party favoured the creation of a South-Slav fed-
eration and the solution of the Macedonian Question within its framework; 
it accepted that the Macedonians were a separate nation, only to change its 
position after Dimitrov’s death.69
In 1979, there were no available primary sources to elucidate the rela-
tionship between Bulgarian and Yugoslav communists regarding the Mace-
donian Question in the period of 1941–48. Nowadays, it is evident that 
the Bulgarian Communist Party did not dissociate itself from the official 
Bulgarian policy in 1941–42, that it tried to play a decisive role in resolv-
ing the Macedonian Question in 1943, rejecting the Yugoslav solution and 
68 “Bugari dokazuju ‘istorijsko pravo’ na teritoriju Makedonije”, Politika, 20 Jan. 1979, 
p. 4.
69 Vančo Apostolski, “Na velikobugarski nacionalističeski pozicii”, Pogledi 16/1 (1979), 
5–51. Tito’s special envoy to the Balkans during the Second World War, Svetozar 
Vukmanović-Tempo, replied to Dragoicheva in a series of articles published in Politika 
from 16 May to 6 June 1980, under the title “Borba za Balkan” [Struggle for the Bal-
kans]. His main thesis was that the policy of the Bulgarian Communist Party regarding 
Macedonia was the same as that of the Bulgarian fascist regime.
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propagating a free, integral and independent Macedonia, and that it oper-
ated under the pressure of the Yugoslav communists in 1944–48.70
Contrary to Vančo Apostolski, Mihailo Apostolski, President of the 
Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and former commander of 
the partisan resistance movement in Yugoslav Macedonia in 1943–44, re-
sponded curtly. In an interview for the Yugoslav weekly Nin, he indirectly 
characterised the Bulgarians as a servile people carrying evil in their genes, 
owing their freedom to foreign powers, but believing that they originated 
from the ancient Thracians and were able to impose their hegemony in the 
Balkans.71
Yugoslavia suspected that the Soviet Union had appropriated the 
Bulgarian standpoint on the Macedonian Question; the Soviet Union 
feared that Yugoslavia might side with China in international affairs. The 
suspicions of the Yugoslav leadership about Soviet partiality towards Bul-
garia found corroboration in the fact that the Soviet press highlighted the 
official declaration of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry in July 1978, and 
Dragoicheva’s Memoirs, without even mentioning the Yugoslav position. 
Moreover, Dragoicheva, as President of the Association of Soviet-Bulgari-
an Friendship, was awarded the Order of the October Revolution. There is 
no doubt that the Soviet Union instrumentalised the Macedonian Question 
as part of its psychological war against Yugoslavia at that time.
To clear up the situation, Yugoslavia’s foreign minister, Miloš Minić, 
visited Moscow in April 1979. He met Andrei Gromyko who did not try 
to hide the Soviet Union’s concern over Yugoslavia’s attitude towards the 
events in Indochina, since Yugoslavia seemed to blur the distinction be-
tween Vietnam’s action in Cambodia and China’s military invasion of Viet-
nam.72 Minić replied that Yugoslavia was against foreign intervention in 
principle. Just as Vietnam invaded Cambodia on the pretext of Pol Pot’s 
regime being a terrorist one, he stressed, so one could invade Yugoslavia 
under the pretext of Tito’s regime being revisionary. Yugoslavia did not ap-
prove of China’s intervention in Vietnam. To appease the Soviets, Minić 
disclosed that Tito had urged China to withdraw troops from Vietnam. In 
continuation, the Yugoslav foreign minister raised the Macedonian Ques-
tion, blaming Moscow for not being impartial.73 Gromyko replied that the 
70 Sfetas, Η διαμόρφωση της σλαβομακεδονικής ταυτότητας, 147–166 and 215–243.
71 “Nemam dokaze, ali tvrdim”, NIN, Belgrade, 4 March 1979, pp. 7–8.
72 AJ, f. 837, KPR/1-2/75: Note on the talks between member of the LCY CC Presi-
dency Miloš Minić and member of the CPSU CC and Minister of Foreign Affairs of 




Soviet Union would remain neutral and did not desire any deterioration of 
Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations over the Macedonian Question, a question on 
which historians could differ, just as Russian historians did on the issue of 
the origin of the Russian people from the Normans. Minić emphasised that 
he was not concerned over matters of history, but of current politics. Refer-
ring to Dragoicheva’a Memoirs, published at the time of Brezhnev’s visit to 
Sofia, he elucidated that Bulgaria called into question Socialist Yugoslavia’s 
legitimacy as a state.
Hua Guofeng’s visit cannot produce a “powder keg” in the Balkans, as 
Bulgaria’s policy towards Yugoslavia does. Until now we believed that the 
contentious issue is that of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, now we 
see that the Macedonian people is proclaimed part of the Bulgarian people, 
that there is no Macedonian people, that Bulgaria lays territorial claims to 
Yugoslavia, especially to the national territory of the Macedonian people. 
Moreover, we are worried about the fact that Bulgaria is a member of the 
Warsaw Pact, whereas Yugoslavia is a non-aligned country. Our protec-
tion is both our readiness to defend our independence, our independent 
and not-aligned policy, and our broad cooperation with most countries 
worldwide. We are not asking the Soviet Union to embrace our positions, 
we have to settle the dispute with Bulgaria by ourselves, but we wish the 
Soviet side to better understand our point of view. If we solve this problem 
with Bulgaria, peace and security will be consolidated in the Balkans.74
It was the first time that Yugoslavia articulated its position to the 
Soviet Union in detail. In fact, Yugoslavia called upon the Soviet Union to 
urge Bulgaria to tone down her anti-Yugoslav polemic pending Tito’s visit 
to Moscow.
In May 1979, Tito paid his last visit to the Soviet Union. His main 
goal was to assure Brezhnev that Yugoslavia’s policy towards China, which 
was trying to exit from isolation, had no anti-Soviet motives, that it was not 
detrimental to Soviet interests. As for the Middle East, Tito made it clear 
that Yugoslavia did advocate a conclusive solution for the Palestinian Ques-
tion, irrespective of the Camp-David agreements. Tito did not fail to men-
tion the Bulgarian-Yugoslav dispute over Macedonia. The Yugoslav leader 
argued that Bulgarian positions were harmful to Yugoslavia’s vital interests 
and that they implied territorial claims. By awarding Dragoicheva the Or-
der of the October Revolution, Tito underscored, the Soviet Union seemed 
to have shared the Bulgarian point of view on the Macedonian Question as 
articulated in her Memoirs.75 Brezhnev replied that Dragoicheva had been 
74 Ibid.
75 AJ, f. 837, KPR/1-2/75: Steno notes of the talks between the President of the Repub-
lic and President of the LCY Josip Broz Tito and Secretary General of the CPSU CC 
Leonid Ilich Brezhnev held on17–18 May in Moscow, Kremlin.
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awarded the Order of the October Revolution for the simple reason that 
she was President of the Association of Soviet-Bulgarian Friendship and 
reached eighty years of age.76 Gromyko, who had already discussed the mat-
ter with Minić, reiterated that the Soviet Union remained neutral as regards 
the Bulgarian-Yugoslav dispute, and called upon both countries to settle the 
question without external mediation.77
After Tito’s visit to the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia ended 
their public polemics. In Indochina, the Soviet Union seemed to gain the 
upper hand. China’s military operation in Vietnam was limited and only 
an act of retaliation, whereas Vietnamese troops stayed in Cambodia until 
1987. In June 1979, Pencho Kumbadinski, a member of the Politburo of 
the Bulgarian Communist Party, met Minić in Belgrade. They discussed the 
whole complex of bilateral relations retrospectively from 1944, but failed 
to find common ground on the past. Both sides demonstrated their differ-
ences, and the outstanding questions were referred to a new summit meet-
ing of Tito and Zhivkov.78 But this meeting never took place.
In late December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. 
Early in January 1980, Tito was hospitalised for circulation problems, with 
little hope of recovery. In the Balkans, the Soviet invasion was expected-
ly hailed only by Bulgaria. Thus, the Bulgarian government was anxious 
about the attitude of the other Balkan states in so far as the Afghanistan 
War could impair Bulgaria’s relations with the neighbouring countries. The 
memorandum on the impact of the Afghanistan events on the Balkan states 
prepared by the Bulgarian ministry of foreign affairs in February 1980, paid 
special attention to Yugoslavia’s position. It was noted that Yugoslavia spoke 
of Soviet “military action”, not explicitly invasion, nevertheless, the Soviet 
Union cut across the principles of International Law regarding the state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.79 At first Yugoslavia placed the respon-
sibility for the new crisis only on the Soviet Union, but she later also held 
NATO responsible, on account of its decision to install missiles in Europe. 
In the Bulgarian view, the most important conclusion that Belgrade drew 
from the Afghanistan War was the Soviet Union’s determination to settle 
outstanding questions by force. In this respect, with Marshal Tito being in 
hospital, the Yugoslav mass media, the Yugoslav diplomats abroad and the 
Yugoslav army in the country were struck by the obsession that Yugoslavia 
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 CDA, f. 1B, op. 60, a.e. 254: Talks between member of the Politburo of the CPB CC 
Dr. Pencho Kubadinski and member of the LCY CC Presidency Dr. Miloš Minić.
79 CDA, f. IB, op. 101, a.e. 346: Information on the impact of the developments in Af-
ghanistan on the Balkans and the attitude of the other Balkan countries, 6 Feb. 1980.
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would be the next victim of the Soviet invasion, that Soviet divisions were 
deployed along the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border. The Memorandum stressed 
that Yugoslavia sought support from Italy, Austria and Romania for the 
contingency of Soviet invasion, and exploited the alleged Soviet threat to 
get economic aid from Western countries.80
Bulgaria branded Yugoslavia’s allegations about a possible Soviet-
Bulgarian military invasion of Yugoslavia as the figment of slanderous 
propaganda. Yet, both sides avoided raising the Macedonian Question in 
open polemics on the political level, as had been the case during the crisis 
in Indochina. Tito died on 4 May 1980. Brezhnev and Zhivkov attended 
Tito’s funeral to sound out the new Yugoslav leadership about Yugoslavia’s 
orientation in the post-Tito era. As Brezhnev disclosed in a meeting with 
Zhivkov in the Crimea in August 1980, the impression he had taken from 
Belgrade was that the new Yugoslav leadership (headed by Lazar Koliševski) 
would continue its balanced policy towards the Soviet Union.81 He now ob-
served that no essential change had occurred in the Yugoslav policy; that the 
new Yugoslav leaders would not let Yugoslavia’s relations with the socialist 
countries deteriorate. Zhivkov remarked that Bulgaria had been extremely 
patient with Yugoslavia, it did not reply to her slanders against the Bulgar-
ian policy, the Bulgarian people and the Bulgarian Communist Party, it re-
frained from open confrontation. But he admitted that the anti-Bulgarian 
campaign in Yugoslavia had been subsiding in the last months.82 Obviously, 
Zhivkov realised that, given the new circumstances, the Soviet Union dis-
approved of the Macedonian Question affecting Bulgarian-Yugoslav rela-
tions.
After Tito’s death, Yugoslavia faced enormous economic difficulties, 
she no longer had the international reputation she had enjoyed in Tito’s 
lifetime, and ceased being a threat to Bulgaria. When Josip Vrhovec, Yugo-
slavia’s new foreign minister, visited Sofia in November 1980, he and Petur 
Mladenov agreed on the following principles: 1) both countries should 
boost their bilateral cooperation; 2) the open issues should not hamper this 
process, as mutually acceptable solutions can be found through constructive 
dialogue.83 Bulgaria followed the internal situation in Yugoslavia carefully, 
and did not rule out the possibility of its break-up. She paid special atten-
80 Ibid.
81 CDA, f. 1B, op. 66, a.e. 2507: Meeting of Comrades Leonid Ilich Brezhnev and To-
dor Zhivkov, Crimea, 7 Avg. 1980.
82 Ibid.
83 Arkhiv na Ministerstvoto na Vunshnite Raboti [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, hereafter AMBnP], f. 115, op. 38, a.e. 3242: Petur Mladenov, Minister of For-
eign Affairs, to the Politburo of the CPB CC, with information on the visit and talks 
S. Sfetas,The Bulgarian-Yugoslav Dispute over the Macedonian Question 267
tion to its domestic problem relating to the Muslim minority. The Macedo-
nian Question was discussed on the margins of bilateral Bulgarian-Yugoslav 
meetings, but in a moderate tone. Each country insisted on its own position, 
but the war over Macedonia was gradually relegated to Bulgarian and Yu-
goslav historians, who, however, were unable to reach a middle ground.84
It is evident that the Macedonian Question plagued Bulgarian-Yu-
goslav relations in the Communist era. The Soviet Union instrumentalised 
this issue according to its interests. Irrespective of the ideological and po-
litical dimensions of the dispute, the Macedonian Question evolved from 
being a matter of territorial security to a matter of identities. With this 
historical background in mind, it becomes easier to understand why Bul-
garia was the first country to recognise the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia under its constitutional name — the Republic of Macedonia 
— but not the Macedonian nation. From the Bulgarian point of view, to 
be a Macedonian means to be a Bulgarian from Macedonia. Bulgarians 
stick to the German model of nationalism, i.e. the emphasis is on blood and 
language, not on national awareness. But in the Balkans ethnicity partly 
overlaps national identity.
Greece stayed away from the Bulgarian-Yugoslav showdown over the 
Macedonian Question. Like Bulgaria, Greece did not recognise either the 
Macedonian nation as a historic entity or the existence of a Macedonian 
minority on her soil. It paved the way for a Greek-Bulgarian understand-
ing. When the Bulgarian-Yugoslav conflict broke out in 1968, the Greek 
junta, in keeping with its anti-communist and anti-Slav ideology, had al-
ready downgraded Greece’s relations with Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia’s role in 
the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) and the presence of political refugees 
(from the Greek part of Macedonia) in the Socialist Republic of Macedo-
nia, who acted there as a pressure group against Greece’s territorial integ-
rity, were stressed in official propaganda. Greece was concerned over the 
decentralisation process in Yugoslavia after Ranković’s downfall, because 
it enabled the Socialist Republic of Macedonia to raise the question of a 
Macedonian minority and to embark on an anti-Greek campaign, with the 
central government being powerless to act as a deterrent. In May 1973, 
even during the military dictatorship, Greece signed a declaration on good 
neighbourliness with Bulgaria. After the downfall of the junta in July 1974, 
the Karamanlis government tried to improve relations with Bulgaria and 
with Yugoslavia as well, in view of the Cyprus crisis and the deterioration of 
Greek-Turkish relations in the Aegean Sea. A number of outstanding ques-
with Josip Vrhovec, Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the SFRY, in Bulgaria from 
17 to 20 Nov. 1980.
84 See Troebst, Bulgarisch-jugoslawische Kontroverse, 151–237.
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tions in Greek-Yugoslav relations were settled (Free Yugoslav Zone in the 
port of Thessaloniki; the signing of a consular convention; exploitation of 
the waters of the river Axios/Vardar).85 However, when Belgrade or Skopje 
raised the question of the Macedonian minority, Greece was affected too. 
Greek protests ensued both in the press and on the diplomatic level.86 It 
forced the Karamanlis government to side with Bulgaria in denying the 
existence both of a Macedonian minority in Greece and of the Macedo-
nian nation as a historic entity. By recognising the existence of Macedonian 
minorities on their soil, both Greece and Bulgaria would have legitimised 
the Macedonian nation in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia. Greece was 
reluctant to offset Yugoslavia’s support on the Cyprus Question by making 
concessions over the Macedonian Question, as one might have calculated in 
Belgrade. Since the Macedonian Question turned into a matter of identi-
ties, the burning question for the Greeks was the distinction between the 
Greek and Slav inhabitants in a broader area of Macedonia. Under the term 
“Macedonians” the Greeks understand either the ancient Macedonians, 
with whom the Slavs share nothing in common, or a geographical term, 
i.e. all the inhabitants of Macedonia, including the Slavs who differentiated 
themselves from the Bulgarians and the Serbs in the twentieth century due 
to political and social circumstances, and forged another identity within a 
statehood. For this reason, the Greeks prefer the term Slavo-Macedonians 
to Macedonians.
Nevertheless, the Greek-Yugoslav dispute over the Macedonian 
Question was an academic one and did not damage bilateral relations. Eco-
nomic and military cooperation superseded emotions over the Macedonian 
Question. Yugoslavia was dependent on Salonica’s harbour to meet her 
need for oil and trade, and Greece’s road to Central Europe passed through 
Yugoslavia. Greece did not rule out the likelihood of increasing Soviet in-
fluence in Yugoslavia after Tito’s death. In this case, Athens feared that the 
Macedonian Question might be complicated by Soviet interference. When 
Evaggelos Averoff-Tositsas, Greek defence minister, visited Yugoslavia in 
October 1976, with Greek General Staff officers, a formal military agree-
ment was discussed. Should the Soviets invade Yugoslavia after Tito’s death, 
85 For a new era in Greek-Yugoslav relations after the downfall of the Greek military 
regime, see Spyridon Sfetas, H Titοϊκή Γιουγκοσλαβία και η μεταπολιτευτική Ελλάδα 
του Καραμανλή (1974–1979). Έγγραφα από τα γιουγκοσλαβικά αρχεία [Tito’s Yugosla-
via and Karamanlis’s Greece after the downfall of the junta 1974–1979. Documents 
from Yugoslav Archives] (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2012).
86 See, e.g., Greek reactions to Marshal Tito’s speech delivered in Skopje on 6 October 
1978: “Δυσχεραίνει τις σχέσεις Αθηνών-Βελιγραδίου το ‘θέμα της μειονότητος’” [The mi-
norities question hampers relations between Athens and Belgrade], Kathemerini, Ath-
ens, 7 Oct. 1978, p. 1.
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Greece would support Yugoslavia. If Turkey attacked Greece, Yugoslavia 
would condemn the Turkish attack and help Greece materially and military 
as well.87 According to the Yugoslav army, Yugoslavia after Tito would be 
threatened not by its internal national contentions, but by a possible foreign 
invasion. However, it turned out that Yugoslavia collapsed under the burden 
of its contradictions, and after her break-up the legacy of the Macedonian 
Question is still alive.
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